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A

POSITIVE BUT UNCERTAIN STEP FORWARD FOR

CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS IN COLORADO: THE

Rostek

DECISION
By VED P.

NANDA*

INTRODUCTION

In First National Bank v. Rostek, I the Supreme Court of
Colorado squarely rejected the mechanical application of the conflict of laws doctrine of lex loci delicti to multistate tort problems.
Instead, it adopted specific choice of law rules to resolve hostguest controversies, and, for all other issues, the court announced
the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts' "general
rule of applying the law of the state with the most 'significant
relationship' with the occurrence and the parties ..

While

".."I

the court's rejection of the Bealean-Restatement First3 dogma is
a desirable step to be welcomed by all proponents of modern
approaches to conflicts, the merit of its preference for formulating
choice of law rules is debatable. Since the court's announcement
has implications not only for future multistate tort controversies
coming before Colorado courts, but also for the general development of this area of the law, which is still very much in flux, this
brief comment is intended to offer a review and appraisal of the
court's approach in Rostek.4 The court's selection of the choice of
law and its reasoning will be examined in light of the alternatives
available to the court.
I.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that
*

Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, Univer-

sity of Denver College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law,
1974-75.
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
2 Id. at 320.
For earlier commentaries on the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), see
Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 555
(1935); Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 183
(1936). See also J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); W. COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of
Contracts: Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893 (1942).
' See also in this issue Walsh, Heads: Lex Loci Delicti; Tails: Lex Loci Domicile The Conflict of Laws Coin on Edge - First National Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo.
1973), 51 DENVER L.J. 567 (1974).
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the broad based doctrine of lex loci delicti offered "some predictability of result and ease of application by courts," 5 it refused to
opt for its application to the facts and circumstances of Rostek
in the face of the demonstrated "injustice and irrationality"
which would result if it were to be applied automatically.' The
stipulated facts in Rostek were uncomplicated. John and Carol
Rostek, husband and wife, both Colorado citizens and residents,
were returning to Colorado after a day-long trip to Iowa and
South Dakota when their twin engine airplane crashed during a
takeoff in Vermillion, South Dakota. The airplane was operated
by the husband and both were killed in the crash. In a wrongful
death action brought in Colorado, the guardian of the natural
children of Carol Rostek, all Colorado residents, alleged that the
husband's negligence caused the death of his guest passenger.
The applicable Colorado law7 would permit recovery; however,
under the South Dakota Aircraft Guest Statute,' such an action
would be barred unless willful or wanton misconduct on the part
of the aircraft operator could be proved.
The trial court considered itself bound by Colorado precedents to apply lex loci and, therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Colorado Supreme Court
granted certiorari "for the sole purpose of determining if Colorado
courts are compelled to apply the doctrine of lex loci delicti (the
law of the place of the wrong)" 9 to the facts in Rostek. Chief
Justice Pringle, writing for the court en banc, emphatically answered the question in the negative, observing that the doctrine
''appears in Colorado law more by default than by design."' 0 The
point was illustrated by reference to two earlier cases, one decided
in 1887" and the other in 1906,2 when the place of the wrong rule
was accepted doctrine "and none challenged it or gave any
thought to its justification or its fairness."'"
The reference to lex loci in a 1956 case, Pando v. Jasper, was
514 P.2d at 318.
'Id.
Although Colorado has a guest statute which might bar recovery [CoLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963)], its definition of "vehicle" as a "motor vehicle" [id. § 13-6-2(6)]
excludes "vehicles . . . that travel through the air" [id. § 13-6-2(2)].
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967).
514 P.2d at 315.
0 Id.
" Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
2 Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 P. 305 (1906).
514 P.2d at 316.
133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956).
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disregarded as "unquestionably dicta." Finally, the court asserted that it was not bound by a federal court's determination
in a 1969 case, Bannowsky v. Krauser,5 since, while sitting as a
diversity court, it had misread Pandoin applying lex loci as Colorado law, "it being well settled that a state court is not bound by
federal court interpretation of state law."'" Thus, the way was
clear for the court to conclude that it "must decide, as a matter
of first impression, whether the broad rule of lex loci delicti
should be adopted and applied to this case, or whether a more
flexible choice of law rule should control."' 7
Next, the court traced the rise and fall of lex loci and the
major reason for its rejection by many other jurisdictions in favor
of a more flexible and rational choice of law approach. To a student of conflicts, it is familiar ground. The mechanical application of lex loci has "often yielded harsh, unjust results" unrelated
to contemporary state interests or to the parties' realistic expectations, and it "no longer provided the high degree of predictability
and uniformity which were considered its primary virtues."' 8 Influential publicists had exposed extensively its weaknesses and
the courts which had initially used manipulative devices such as
"characterization" to escape the unacceptable results of its rigid
application eventually abandoned lex loci in their "constant
search for a result which would comport with reason and justice
'19

After rejecting the traditional doctrine, the court examined
the available alternatives in its search for a substitute. It identified various current approaches to choice of law problems with
their varying emphases on the place of the forum, the expectations of the parties, and governmental interests by referring to
their major proponents in string citations.2 It noted that all of
these approaches suffered from common deficiencies: they had to
be applied in an ad hoc fashion and they all contained "indeterminate language with no concrete guidelines."' 21 The court felt
uncomfortable with the resulting lack of "consistency in application" and "predictability of results" and expressed its preference
1 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
'7

514 P.2d at 316 n.1.
Id. at 316.

's

Id. at 317.

"

IId.
'

Id. at 318 nn.4 & 5.
Id. at 318.
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for the adoption of rational choice of law rules instead of dealing
with each case on an ad hoc basis. It agreed with Professors Willis
Reese" and Maurice Rosenberg,2 3 two major advocates of formulating choice of law rules, that the adoption of rational rules in
multistate torts is necessary to accomplish the objective of providing "a concrete and viable system for the equal application of
just laws.''
The die was cast. In the court's words: "While we recognize
that a rational and equitable approach to choice of law is desirable, we now harmonize that approach with the genius of the common law which always sought to provide to its consumers some
degree of predictability and consistency in application." 5 The
search was thus narrowed for a "workable" choice of law rule to
be applied in the guest-host area. The majority opinion in a 1972
New York case, Neumeier v. Kuehner, written by Chief Judge
Fuld, was found to be eminently suited for that opportunity.
There, Chief Judge Fuld had admitted the lack of consistency in
New York cases ever since that court had adopted the interest
analysis approach in Babcock v. Jackson.27 His concurrence in
Tooker v. Lopez,2" in which he had enunciated specific rules to
resolve host-guest controversies, which eventually became the
majority rule in Neumeier, had received the unqualified support
of Professor Willis Reese, the reporter of the Restatement
Second.29 The court was persuaded that the first two of the three
Neumeier rules ought to be accepted in Colorado and it did so,
finding them "just and equitable. 30 Commenting in general on
the Neumeier formulation, the court said that it "generally embodies the rational underpinnings of the newer approaches to
choice of law problems, emphasizing the expectations of the parties and the interests of the different jurisdictions involved."'"
The two rules adopted were: (1) When the guest-passenger and
the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the vehicle
22 The court cited Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315

(1972). 514 P.2d at 319.
11The court cited Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551,
641 (1968). 514 P.2d at 319.
2, 514 P.2d at 318-19.
25 Id.

at 318.

2- 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
"7 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2- 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
See Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 562 (1971).
31

514 P.2d at 319.
Id.

1974
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is registered there, that state's law should govern the question of
host-guest immunity; and (2) When the guest-passenger is from
a state which permits recovery and the host-driver is from a guest
statute state, the law of the state where the accident occurred
should apply.2 However, under "special circumstances," a driver
might "be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense"
if he causes the accident in the state which permits recovery.3
Rostek was a "comparatively easy" case,34 to which the first
Neumeier rule was applicable. However, since the court had already rejected lex loci, and since the Neumeier rules applied only
to host-guest controversies, it announced the adoption of the
Restatement Second's most "significant relationship" formulation, "as presented and defined" in section 145, to all other multistate torts.3 5 Acknowledging that "this Restatement rule is
somewhat broad," the court expressed the hope that "at some
time in the future, as the body of case law develops, we can lay
down more specific choice of law rules governing other areas, as
we have done today in the area of guest statutes."'
II.
The following questions raised by Rostek will be discussed
here briefly: (1) What are the implications of Rostek for Colorado
conflicts law and the law of conflicts in general? (2) Did the court
succeed in its quest for certainty, uniformity, and predictability
by the adoption of the Neumeier-Restatement Second formula?
and (3) Is it desirable to formulate precise choice of law rules for
multistate torts at this stage in the development of conflicts law?
A.

Implications of Rostek

The Colorado Supreme Court accepted the responsibility
that lies on the highest state courts to play a major role in the
development of a coherent body of conflicts law, especially in the
choice of law area. The court's discussion of the New York experience since Babcock and its reference to several other jurisdictions and to leading commentators show the court's awareness
32

Id.

33 Id.
31 Id. at 320.
3Id.
36 Id.

"' State courts have ample freedom in making choice of law decisions since constitutional restraints on such selection are minimal. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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and concern with the inconsistencies and tensions of the last decade resulting from the fact that there has been no consensus on
the selection of a substitute for lex loci. However, the court refused to follow the lead of some of its sister states in adopting a
wait-and-see attitude;3 instead, it rejected lex loci and accepted
the challenge to search for a workable solution. It would be a
reasonable observation to suggest that the vested rights approach
would give way in Colorado to modem approaches in other areas
of conflicts as well, especially as applied to contracts.
In deciding Rostek, the court could have adopted any of the
modern choice of law approaches and would have arrived at the
just and rational result which it eventually achieved by applying
the Neumeier rule. The court's reading of the various comments
on Babcock9 had shown it that its choice of any of the contactpolicy variants which would result in the application of Colorado
law would have pleased almost all commentators except a
staunch advocate of vested rights supremacy who might lament
the passing of the good old days. Initially the court began to look
at the contacts with concerned states and the court mentioned
the term "interests" a few times, but it did not further pursue its
analysis of concerned interests to select the applicable law. Instead, it sought concrete rules, not only to decide the controversy
in Rostek, but to lay a foundation on which it could build further
with the passage of time. As a result, the court felt uniquely
comfortable with the rules and rationale of Neumeier. In approaching and accepting the rules, though, the court seems to
have lost options and flexibility which are necessary for further
experimentation and for evolution and growth of the law in a
sound common law setting.
The court viewed the adoption of the Neumeier-Restatement
Second rules as a harmonious blending of "[a desirable] rational
and equitable approach to choice of law . . . with the genius of
Many courts have rejected the new approaches. See, e.g., Landers v. Landers, 153
Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Colhoun v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400
P.2d 1018 (1965); Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968); Abendschein v. Farrell,
382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Peterson v. Dean, 186 Neb. 716, 186 N.W.2d 107
(1971); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 194
N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972); Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972).
" The court referred in Rostek to two comments on Babcock, one each by Professors
Currie and Reese, from a symposium issue: Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233, 1251 (1963). 514 P.2d at
318 n.4.

CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO

the common law which always sought to provide to its consumers
some degree of predictability and consistency in application."40
The invocation of the "genius of common law" initially sounds
attractive. However, a closer examination of the court's methodology and rationale in adopting narrow rules, not only to resolve
the Rostek controversy but as the applicable law for the future,
leads one to conclude that the court displayed an affinity for legal
positivism by suggesting that only a formulation of narrow, precise rules would comport with the common law.
Notwithstanding the merits of codification in specific areas
of the law, the fact remains that the common law is not perceived
or known to comprise a system of neat, precise, infallible rules;
it allows for experimentation, evolution, and growth resulting in
a gradual accumulation of wisdom over a period of time which
eventually finds expression in legal propositions, definitions, concepts, principles, and rules. 4 In a recent essay,42 Professor Simpson of Oxford forcefully refutes positivism by observing that:
[It] consequently distorts the nature of the system to conceive of
the common law as a set of rules, an essentially precise and finite
notion, as if one could in principle both state the rules of the common law and count them like so many sheep, or engrave them on
tablets of stone."

In addition to the problems of positivism, the discussion in the
next section will suggest that the court's objective of achieving
predictability and consistency by the application of the rules it
has formulated is illusory.
B.

Would the Rules Adopted by the Court Achieve Predictability, Certainty, and Uniformity of Application?

The application of the first Neumeier rule to Rostek's facts
offers a just and rational solution. In host-guest cases before the
New York Court of Appeals from Babcock to Neumeier, including
Dym v. Gordon," Macey v. Rozbicki, "4 and Tooker v. Lopez," and
514 P.2d at 318.
See generally Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS INLEGAL PHILOsopHY
25 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
41 Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
(Second Series) 77 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
43Id. at 88. It is a feature of the system that "uniquely authentic statements of the
rules which, so positivists tell us, comprise the common law, cannot be made." Id. at 90.
See also, id. at 88 for a citation to F. POLLACK, A FIRST BOOK OF JUmSPRUDENCE 249 (3d
ed. 1911) where Pollack observes that the common law professes "to develop and apply
principles that have never been committed to any authentic form of words."
," 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
4518 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (19J6).
" 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
40
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before lower New York courts, such as Kell v. Henderson,47
Arbuthnot v. Allbright,4 8 Weinstein v. Abraham,4" and Bray v.
Cox,510 the courts undertook extensive analysis of the policies underlying the statutes and the interests of concerned jurisdictions
in the application of their respective laws to the specific issues
involved in the controversies. The courts in Dym and Macey relied on the now discarded "seat of the relationship" test,5' to
apply Colorado law and deny recovery in the former case but to
apply New York law and permit recovery in the latter.
Whatever the objective of the guest statute-the protection
of insurers and the maintenance of low insurance rates, the protection of hosts from ungrateful guests, or the prevention of fraudulent claims by passengers in collusion with drivers 5 -it seems
desirable that if both parties are domiciliaries of a state where the
vehicle is also insured and garaged, and that state permits recovery, that state's law should apply even if the state of injury as the
forum has a guest statute. Conversely, when the state of the injury permits recovery and the state of the parties' domicile where
the vehicle is insured has a guest statute, the forum should apply
the latter law, notwithstanding the former's interests in encour,147 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970).
64 Misc. 2d 76, 314 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972).
The majority in Tooker explicitly rejected the seat of relationship test, stating that
"[w]here the guest-host relationship 'arose' or is 'centered' is wholly irrelevant to policies reflected by the laws in conflict. Any language in our earlier opinions lending support
to a contrary view has . . .been overruled." 24 N.Y.2d at 579 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at 400 n.2,
301 N.Y.S. 2d at 527 n.2.
For a convincing criticism of the seat of relationship test see Rosenberg, Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson-An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
459, 462-63 (1967).
11 The California Supreme Court invalidated California's 44-year-old automobile
guest statute in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
See generally Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechanical Jurisprudence Versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1967); Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Desperanto of State
"Interests",68 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1968); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of
Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable
Laws": I, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 599-602 (1960); Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12
TEXAS L. REV. 303 (1934); Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CInc. L. REV. 24 (1937); Note,
Guest Statutes: Have Recent Cases Brought Them to the End of the Road?, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 446 (1973); Comment, JudicialNullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 884 (1968); Comment, The Future of the Automobile Guest Statute, 45 TEMP. L.Q.
432 (1972). See also Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 119, 122, 296 N.E.2d 243, 245, 343
N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1973).
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aging highway safety, compensating accident victims, protecting
the economic interests of its vendors dealing with accident victims, and ensuring that nonresident accident victims do not become public charges. An analysis of the advancement of relevant
state policies should point to these suggested results. 3 The same
results would also be reached by applying any of the other modern
approaches such as principled preferences,54 most significant relationship,5 and functional analysis.5" It should be added that, although predictability in multistate torts is mostly irrelevant, it
is of consequence when questions concerning the parties' relationship giving rise to their rights and duties and questions of insuror's liability are in issue.5 7
It should be noted that in one recent case," the Supreme
Court of Minnesota applied Minnesota negligence law, rejecting
the Ontario guest statute even though all of the parties involved
in an accident in Minnesota were Ontario residents and the automobile was registered, insured, and garaged in Ontario. During a
1-day trip from Ontario to Duluth, Minnesota, the car went off
the road in Minnesota, seriously injuring the plaintiff-guest. The
court adopted the "better law" approach, suggesting that Minnesota as a "justice-administering state" would have its governmental interests furthered by the application of its own "better
law." It was "firmly convinced of the superiority of the common
53For a brief but incisive discussion, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 237-44 (1971); Sedler, InterstateAccidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 133-34 (1973) and the authorities
cited therein. Professors Ehrenzweig and Rheinstein consider interest analysis
unworkable. See generally Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From
Beale to Covers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1966); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promisein Multistate
Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 847 (1967); Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 Am.J.
COMp. L. 632 (1962). See also Rosenberg, supra note 51, at 463-64.
" See generally D. CAVERS, CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS LAW IN MODERN PERSPECTIVE
(1970); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 139-203 (1965); Cavers, The Value of

Principled Preferences, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 211 (1971).
" See Note, Most Significant Contacts Method: An Empirical Analysis, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 575, 591-97 (1972).
56 See generally A. VON MEHREN

& D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
76-79, 102-25 (1965).
" Professor Weintraub, however, considers the "talk of 'surprising' the insurer [as]
• . .very likely to be talking nonsense." R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 206 (1971), citing McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 398 (1968), and Stern, Ratemaking Proceduresfor Automobile Liability Insurance,
52 PROC. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y 139 (1965).
" Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
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law rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest statute,"5' and
preferred to apply the Minnesota law consistent "with our own
concept of fairness and equity."6 0 Professors Leflar' and Ehrenzweig were quoted extensively by the majority to lend support
to its decision. Among cases relied upon by the court were Kell
v. Henderson,63 Clark v. Clark," and Conklin v. Horner.5 Other
supportive cases included Bray v. Cox," Arnett v. Thompson, 7
and Gagne v. Berry.6 This combination of lex fori and the better
law approach could serve as an escape mechanism, permitting
courts to apply their own law without facing hard choice of law
questions. This is lex loci in a different, albeit more palatable
form. But the risk of parochialism and of mechanical application
render this combination even more dangerous than the already
discarded rule.
Under the second Neumeier rule adopted by the Colorado
court, the law of the state where the accident occurred would
apply when the guest-passenger is from a state which permits
recovery and the host-driver is from a guest statute state. The
court was not obliged to adopt this rule to resolve the controversy
presented in Rostek. Why then did it adopt the second rule, especially when it did not adopt the third Neumeier rule which is
applicable to other situations where the passenger and the driver
are domiciled in different states? As stated by Chief Judge Fuld,
the third rule will normally apply the law "of the state where the
accident occurred, but not if it can be shown that displacing that
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive
law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multistate system, or producing great uncertainty for litigants."69
51Id. at 417.
60Id.
" The court cited Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 279 (1966), and Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations,54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 412, 414.
62 The court quoted extensively from Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better
Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847, 853 (1967).
Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 414.
1147 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 411.
64 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 411.
65 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at

416.
39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972).
433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
68 290 A.2d 624 (N.H. 1972).
66 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
66
67
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Both the second and third rules which are strongly territorially oriented are reminiscent of the First Restatement philosophy. Neumeier involved the application of the third rule. It was
a difficult case for Professor Currie's governmental analysis approach, 70 since it involved the "unprovided for" case,7 ' in which
neither contact state had an identifiable, legitimate governmental interest in the application of its law. The defendant, a New
York resident, drove to Ontario, Canada, where he picked up his
guest, an Ontario resident, and, on a trip between two points in
Ontario, collided with a train, resulting in the death of both the
guest and the host. Ontario had a guest statute requiring willful
negligence to be proved for recovery while New York had no guest
statute which would bar recovery. Thus, New York's policy favoring compensation would have no application since the plaintiff
was a nondomiciliary. Similarly, regardless of the rationale underlying Ontario's guest statute7 it would not be applicable to
the issue of guest-host immunity in a case involving a New York
defendant and a New York insuror.73 The court concluded that,
because the defendant was a New York resident, it would not
serve the substantive law purposes of New York to displace lex
loci in this case, since the application of New York law would only
result in the "exposure of this State's domiciliaries to a greater
liability than that imposed upon resident users of Ontario's highways." '7' New York, the court said, "has no legitimate interest in
ignoring the public policy" of Ontario and "in protecting the
"' Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 178 presents Professor Currie's original theories which he subsequently modified. See
generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1233 (1963); Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws,
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961); Hill,Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A
Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961); R.
Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657 (1959).
"' Professor Currie discussed the dilemma in Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 229 (1958). See also
Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 10, 30 (1969); Baade,
The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFSTaA L. REV. 150,
165-67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Baade]; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROS. 754 (1963); Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case:
Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV. 125 (1973).
7 Section 105(2) of the Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, REV. STAT. ONT.
ch. 172 (1960), as amended by Ontario Statute of 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2). For a thorough
and incisive analysis of the statute see Baade, supra note 71, at 150-56.
" Baade, supra note 71, at 161-62; Sedler, supra note 71, at 137-38.
" 31 N.Y.2d at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a
vehicle traveling within its borders."75
It is not the purpose here to analyze the New York court's
justification for the application of Ontario law on the immunity
issue. Others have done that extensively and meticulously, pointing to the need for the identification of a common policy of New
York and Ontario in compensating the victim." However, the
point is that if the Colorado court deliberately refused to adopt
the third Neumeier rule because of the rule's strong territorial
bias and the court's distaste for it, it would also seem that the
second Neumeier rule is as heavily oriented toward lex loci. Furthermore, if the prior case law in other jurisdictions" and the
recent New York wrongful death case, Rosenthal v. Warren,"
offer any insight, the goal of consistency and uniformity in result
is still an illusory ideal.
In all tort controversies not involving the host-guest relationship the Rostek court has announced that Colorado will follow the
Restatement Second's section 145, which is a characteristic black
letter formulation:
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.11

It further delineates "factual" contacts to be identified in selecting the state with the most significant relationship to the tort. Of
primary significance among the specified contacts is the place
where the injury occurred. This is followed by: the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, or place of business of the
parties; and the place of the center of relationship between the
parties. 0 The Restatement Second sections applying section 145
to specific torts8 place heavy reliance upon lex loci to identify the
state with the most significant relationship.
Section 6 identifies factors relevant to the choice of the appl7' Id. at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
76 Baade, supra note 71, at 161-67; Sedler, supra note 71, at 137-42.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Foster v. Leggett,
484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
78 342 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afj'd, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS

Id. § 145(2).
SI Id. §§ 146-55.
'o

§ 145(1) (1969).

CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO

icable law. These principles which courts are asked to consider 2
include: the needs of interstate and international systems; the
relevant policies of concerned states and basic policies of the
particular field of law; the protection of justified expectations;
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.83
The major criticism of the Restatement Second approach' is
that it does not offer sufficient guidelines and criteria for the
selection of the state of the most significant relationship. Its
major emphasis on physical contacts, giving priority to the place
of injury, is likely to lead a court to the application of lex loci,
which the Restatement Second apparently took great pains in
discarding. This concern is especially serious for two reasons:
first, the Restatement Second does not emphasize the need for
analysis of the nature and content of the physical contacts with
a view to identifying relevant contacts, and especially those contacts which advance the interests of concerned states and parties
mentioned in section 6; and second, courts have yet to develop
criteria for the weighing of these factors and contacts. Hence, the
results are likely to be erratic, arbitrary, and less certain. 5
C.

Is the Formulation of Choice of Law Rules at This Stage of
the Development of Torts Conflicts Desirable?

There seems to be a consensus that the formulation of allembracing, broad rules of the lex loci genre will stifle the evolutionary process begun by Babcock. But beyond that there is lack
of agreement on the desirable course of action. For instance, Professors Reese" and Rosenberg, 7 and Chief Judge Fuld" advocate
1'Id.
3

§ 6(2).

Id. § 6. See also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.

REv. 959 (1952).
K The major critic of this approach is Professor Ehrenzweig. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CoNrrEMP.
PROB. 700 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal ForIts
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1235-36 (1965). See also Leflar, The Torts Provisions
of the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 269 (1972); Comment, The Second
Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 762 (1963). But see Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963);
Morris, Book Review, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 322 (1973).
A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 26-28 (3d ed. 1974).
86 Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and the Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548 (1971);
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEL L. REv. 315 (1972).
'7 Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551, 641 (1968);
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson-An Opinion for the New York Court of
Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1967).
11Chief Judge Fuld's imprint is seen in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d
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narrow choice of law rules; Professor Cavers 5 offers his principled
preferences; and Professors Leflar 0 and Ehrenzweig" suggest better law and lex loci respectively. Their main concern is that, in
the absence of narrow rules, ad hoc interest analysis will create
further confusion in the already chaotic state of affairs, especially
in conflicts involving multistate torts.
In the wake of demolishing the vested rights concept,
Babcock left many questions unanswered. What exactly was to
be substituted for lex loci was not clear then and still is not.
However, a decade is not such an intolerably long period for experimentation with various approaches that one should equate
the lack of any precise rules of law with chaos and anarchy. It is
a salutory development that courts in this country92 and abroad 3
have sought just and rational results by the application of various
approaches which demand an appraisal of varying state and governmental interests and the parties' interests with a view to arriving at just, rational, and equitable results.
In seeking workable choice of law rules Chief Justice Pringle
is in good company. The Reese-Rosenberg-Fuld coalition has formulated the New York law and many jurisdictions are likely to
follow the New York-Colorado model, for courts are hesitant to
conduct ad hoc analysis and usually are comforted by the ease of
394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454,
335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). See also Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and the Choice of Law, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1971).
" See note 54 supra. See also Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?
Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 141 (1967);
Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 377 (1966).
1*R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 233-65 (1968); Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More
on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966); Leflar, The "New"
Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 457 (1972).
",A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 85, at 39-52; Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637
(1960).
92 A summary of significant cases is contained in R. WENTRAUB,COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 234 n.36 (1971).
" See, e.g., Lipstein, Conflict of Laws 1921-1971-The Way Ahead, 31 CaMB.L.J. 67
(1972); InternationalDevelopments in Choice of Law Governing Torts, 19 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 1 (1971). For comments on the House of Lords decision of Chaplin v. Boys, [1969] 3
W.L.R. 322, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085, see Karsten, Foreign Torts and English Courts: II.
Chaplin v. Boys: Another Analysis, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (1970); North & Webb,
Foreign Torts and English Courts: L The Effect of Chaplin v. Boys, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
24 (1970); Reese, Choice of Law in Tort Cases-Chaplin v. Boys-(England: Court of
Appeal and House of Lords), 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 189 (1970).
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applying precise rules to cases and controversies before them.
There is no denying that rules can serve a useful purpose; but the
point is that in order to be just, rational, and equitable they
should reflect community consensus, and the timing at which a
consensus has emerged in any one area is of the essence. In torts
conflicts the formulation of precise rules remains premature. The
Restatement Second's guidelines show remnants of the First Restatement's vested rights philosophy. However, if courts properly
understand and apply the principles contained in section 6, always keeping in perspective the interests of parties and of concerned states, and always mindful of the danger that physical
contacts could be manipulated with ease to favor the application
of lex fori or lex loci, the most significant relationship would
merely be another way of identifying a just and rational resolution of controversies.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Colorado has assumed the role of a
forward-looking state court in charting a new course in choice of
law for multistate torts. Since it has recently taken a similarly
enlightened approach in other areas of the law as well, it is expected and hoped that it will watch with a keen eye the operation
of the rules it adopted in Rostek and that it will not hesitate to
review and revise them if and when the need to do so is demonstrated. The role of the highest state courts in fashioning rational,
just, equitable, and workable choice of law approaches with a
view toward eventually creating a coherent body of law cannot be
overstated.

